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Abstract 
Who gets a seat at the table and who does not is an important consideration for successful 
peacemaking. However, current research does not provide sufficient guidance for understanding 
the politics of participation in peace negotiations. The present article thus develops a conceptual 
framework for understanding these dynamics. Its central theme is that the inclusion or exclusion 
of a given actor in peace negotiations is affected by two independent factors. One factor pertains 
to the practical requirements of the peace process and addresses the following question: does the 
participation of a given actor augment the chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement? 
The other factor relates to the normative dimension of peace talks: is the participation of a given 
actor consistent with the values of international mediators and sponsors of peace negotiations? 
The article argues that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion result from the interplay of these 
two factors. The most straightforward situation for mediators is when practical requirements and 
international norms are mutually reinforcing. Difficulties arise from scenarios where practical 
effectiveness and norms contradict each other. This is the case when the involvement of a given 
person (or group) is imperative in terms of the peace process, but difficult to justify politically 
because this person has committed terrorist acts or is indicted by an international court. 
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Introduction: The Conundrum of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations 
Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts, military coups, refugee numbers, as well as war 
casualties have diminished significantly. According to Andrew Mack et al., “many of these 
changes could be attributed to an explosion of international activism … that sought to stop 
ongoing wars, help negotiate peace settlements, support post-conflict reconstruction, and prevent 
old wars from starting again.” (Human Security Centre 2007: 1) The merits of such optimism 
aside, it is clear that international mediation as a practice in world politics has increased in the 
past 20 years. Consequently, scholars have tried to understand the circumstances in which 
mediation successfully produces a sustainable peace settlement. Among different factors – such 
as the timing of third-party interventions (Zartman 1989 [1985]), the type of mediation 
(Beardsley et al. 2006), and the skills of the mediator (Rubin 1992: 251) – the nature of the 
parties participating in peace negotiations is also of relevance. In other words, it matters who 
gets a seat at the negotiating table. Some authors have thus argued that mediation is likely to be 
more effective when the people at the table are recognized as the legitimate spokespersons of 
their parties (Bercovitch 2002: 262). Others have discussed the role of “spoilers,” trying to 
understand when the exclusion of intransigent hardliners is beneficial for the peace process in the 
long run (Stedman 1997). These studies notwithstanding, current research on international 
mediation does not provide sufficient guidance for understanding the politics of participation in 
peace negotiations. These politics are characterized by the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion – 
defined here as a stakeholder’s direct participation and involvement (or lack thereof) in the 
decision-making process of official peace negotiations. 
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Who gets a seat at the table is not only a relevant academic question, it has significant political 
implications. It matters for conflict parties, given that their active participation in peace 
negotiations potentially generates domestic political support and international legitimacy and 
secures their influence in post-conflict state institutions. Participation in peace talks can also be 
problematic for conflict parties when domestic constituencies accuse them of selling out to the 
enemy. It also matters for states and international organizations acting as mediators since the 
groups that they are working with reflect on their prestige and values on the world stage. Not 
surprisingly, decisions about who gets a seat in peace negotiations often provoke controversy. 
Current discussions about whether or not Hamas should be included in the Middle East peace 
process are a case in point, as is the debate about the feasibility of negotiations with the Taliban 
in Afghanistan. On a more general level, peace practitioners have debated whether individuals 
indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) can legitimately participate in peace talks. 
Likewise, they are unsure about the implications of the recent US Supreme Court decision in the 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project case, which sets out that any activity with designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) constitutes a federal crime in the US under the so-called 
“material support law.” The current situation is thus that the legal lines remain a blur, mediators 
follow ad-hoc practices, and international sponsors have yet to develop a coherent policy in 
regards to inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations. 
 
The premise of this article is that there are two independent factors which affect the inclusion or 
exclusion of a given actor in peace negotiations. The first relates to the practical requirements of 
the peace process and addresses the following question: does the participation of a given actor 
augment the chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement? The other factor relates to the 
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normative dimension of international mediation: is the participation of a given actor consistent 
with the values of international mediators and sponsors of peace negotiations? The dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion thus result from the interplay between these two factors. The most 
comfortable situation for mediators is when practical requirements and international norms are 
mutually reinforcing. Difficulties arise from scenarios where practical effectiveness and norms 
contradict each other. This is the case when the involvement of a given person (or group) is 
imperative in terms of the peace process, but difficult to justify politically because this person 
has committed terrorist acts or is indicted by an international court. 
 
In addressing these issues, the present article pursues two objectives. First, it seeks to make a 
modest contribution to the understanding of why certain actors are included while others are 
excluded from peacemaking efforts. Drawing on academic literature from negotiation theory as 
well as peace and conflict studies, the article proposes a conceptual framework for understanding 
inclusion and exclusion dynamics. This framework is not based on systematic empirical work, 
but presents a number of initial reflections upon which future research will hopefully elaborate. 
Second, this article aims to shed light on a number of questions that policy-makers and mediation 
practitioners grapple with in their work, offering some analytical guidance for them in the 
process. 
 
I. The Context of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations 
The expansion of peacemaking after the end of the Cold War 
Bercovitch (2009: 343) defined mediation as 
a process of conflict management, related to, but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, 
where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to 
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change their perceptions or behavior and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking 
the authority of law. 
In the realm of international affairs, mediation, or ‘peacemaking’, involves the intervention in 
armed conflicts of external actors – states, international and regional organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals – with the aim of mitigating tensions 
between conflict parties in a process of negotiation (Zartman and Touval 2008). The foundation 
for mediation as an international practice was laid out in the UN Charter, in particular its Chapter 
VI regarding the pacific settlement of disputes. These provisions acquired meaning through Dag 
Hammarskjöld’s ideas of ‘preventive diplomacy’ in the 1950s (Schachter 1962), although the 
polarization of world politics during the Cold War made it difficult to put them into practice 
(Jolly et al. 2009: 165-169). The end of the Cold War however, significantly altered this status 
quo and brought about a marked increase of the use of mediation in international conflicts 
(Babbitt 2009). Figures of the International Crisis Behavior Project show that in the 1980s 
approximately 30% of international crises received mediation; this number rose to 50% in the 
early and mid-1990s. Peacemaking declined somewhat around the turn of the millennium, but 
the latest data indicates a renewed surge in the last years (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
2007: 6-7). As a result, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the number of conflicts 
ending after a peace settlement rose from 21% between 1946 and 1989 to 37% from 1990 to 
2005; at the same time, conflict termination via military victory diminished from 44 to 21% 
(quoted in Human Security Centre 2007: 19-20). 
 
This development was further facilitated by the increasing institutionalization of mediation 
activities in the context of the advancement of the conflict resolution field since the end of the 
Cold War (Kriesberg 2001). This has meant that mediation as an activity has become 
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increasingly embedded within the foreign policies of states as well as the programs of 
international organizations. Accordingly, bureaucratic entities dealing specifically with conflict 
resolution have been created, budgets made available, and political capital invested to promote 
mediation (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009). As a result, the practice of mediation has become 
normal in the sense that it constitutes a standard international response to armed conflicts in the 
world. This process of institutionalization has been reinforced in recent years with the creation of 
mediation support entities that offer permanent assistance to mediators in terms of logistics, 
knowledge management, training, and research. Mediation support has thus fostered a process of 
professionalization, which has helped to move international mediation beyond an ad hoc practice 
towards a professional field including a community of practitioners, established training 
programs, codes of conduct, and some accountability mechanisms.1 
 
Within the United Nations (UN), the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit is one outcome 
of the growing institutionalization of mediation activities. Equally important was the high-level 
meeting of the UN Security Council in September 2008, during which states across the board 
praised mediation for its contribution to international peace and security (UN Security Council 
2008). The UN Secretary-General subsequently published a report on mediation, which sets out 
the state of the art of the field (Ban 2009). Regional organizations are also expanding their 
mediation activities. In a recent concept paper, the European Union (EU) committed to playing 
“a more active role” in the area of mediation through “a more coordinated and focused 
                                                 
1 Instrumental in the emergence of such guidelines has been the Mediation Support Network (MSN), which brings 
together the major players in the mediation support field: the Berghof Foundation (based in Germany), the Center 
for Peace Mediation (Germany), Conciliation Resources (UK), the Crisis Management Initiative (Finland), the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy (Sweden), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Switzerland), the Initiative on Conflict 
Prevention through Quiet Diplomacy (Canada), Swisspeace, the Center for Security Studies (Switzerland), the UN 
Mediation Support Unit, and the US Institute of Peace. For an overview of the MSN, see 
<http://mcr.frameworks.usip.org/> [Accessed on 16 July 2010]. 
-8- 
 
approach” (Council of the European Union 2008: 2). Likewise, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is currently undertaking efforts to develop mediation support 
through its Conflict Prevention Centre (Fugfugosh 2008), and there are plans to strengthen the 
mediation capacity of the African Union (Nathan 2008). Moreover, small and medium states, 
such as Norway and Switzerland, who have been proactive in this field since the 1990s, have 
furthered their engagement in conflict resolution in the last few years.2 Also of note is the entry 
onto the mediation scene of non-Western states, such as Qatar, who mediated between rival 
Lebanese factions in 2008 and who currently sponsors the Darfur peace talks. Burkina-Faso’s 
role bears mentioning as well: the country has successfully brokered a peace accord in Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2007 and it initiated the high-level meeting of the UN Security on mediation in 2008. 
The expansion of international mediation has also been fostered by a number of NGOs that have 
emerged as ‘mediation entrepreneurs.’ Groups like the Carter Centre, the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, and the Crisis Management Initiative are today professional 
organizations, with experienced staff and significant budgets (Taulbee and Creekmore 2003; 
Huber 2004). They actively seek mediation opportunities and are often tasked with getting 
involved in situations that are too politically sensitive for states (Aall 2007; Chigas 2007; Bartoli 
2009). 
 
A detailed analysis of why the mediation field has expanded so significantly since the end of the 
Cold War goes beyond the scope of this article. As a hypothesis however, we argue that this 
expansion is underpinned by both material and normative developments in world politics. On the 
material side, it is notable that the cost of war for states has risen significantly, both in terms of 
                                                 
2 In Switzerland, for example, the Parliament in 2004 adopted a specific bill on civilian peacebuilding, which 
provides a legal framework and financing model permitting long-term commitments by the Swiss government in the 
field of conflict resolution. (For details, see Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2007).   
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the actual costs of fighting a war as well as in terms of the tolerance of casualties in domestic 
public opinion (Nye 2004: 18-24). The use of military power in foreign policy has diminished, 
but at the same time international conflicts still pose a security threat for many states. In 
particular since September 11, there is a growing perception that more should be done to address 
the sources of instability in the developing world, considering the threat that they pose to the 
security of western states (Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005). Given its relative 
cost-effectiveness, international mediation has thus emerged as an attractive instrument of 
conflict management. 
 
As far as the normative structure of world politics is concerned, the erosion of the absolute 
principle of sovereignty has had an important role in paving the way for increased international 
intervention in armed conflicts. In the last 20 years, the threshold for responsible behavior of 
sovereign states has been elevated to include actions inside their territory. This includes a 
minimum respect for human rights and the protection of their citizens from grave physical harm. 
Where governments are unwilling or unable to live up to this responsibility, the international 
community has a duty to intervene (Deng et al. 1996; Evans and Sahnoun 2001). International 
mediation does not contradict sovereignty per se – indeed, mediation is by definition non-
coercive and requires the acquiescence of the conflict parties. However, it does constitute a form 
of external intervention in the internal affairs of a country, which previously may have been 
considered unacceptably intrusive. The expansion of international mediation may also have been 
fostered by an emerging ‘peacemaking norm,’ which refers to the idea that armed conflicts 
should be solved through non-violent means, such as negotiations, rather than through the use of 
military force. Future research will have to address whether or not this is a plausible concept. 
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What is striking, however, is that when violence breaks out today, states generally call for peace 
negotiations as well as offering their assistance via mediation. Arguments, such as Luttwak’s 
(1999) proposal to “give war a chance” seem to be increasingly marginal and are even 
considered unethical. Of course, this does not mean that wars no longer occur or that the use of 
military force as a policy instrument has become unacceptable. By and large however, the 
expected way of resolving armed conflicts on the international stage is through negotiation and 
mediation. 
 
The convergence of international norms and practical requirements 
What does the expansion of mediation since the end of the Cold War mean for the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion? One consideration is that when states and international organizations 
get involved and invest political capital in mediation processes, these processes move away from 
a strictly domestic political logic and become a matter of international concern. Thus, when 
international mediators get involved in peace negotiations, we can expect them to project their 
own interests and values onto these processes. This is not to say that mediators are all powerful 
or that they dominate what happens in peace negotiations. While the leverage used by mediators 
varies, they generally do not use coercive means to impose an agreement on the parties. 
However, international mediators do in fact shape the mediation process, despite the rhetoric of 
neutrality with which mediators often coat their interventions. They do so, among other things, 
by setting the agenda; providing training to conflict parties; bringing in technical experts; and 
drafting peace agreements.  
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The rationale of such influence is twofold. One is that peace negotiations are showcases through 
which the world views states and international organizations acting as mediators. Many states see 
peacemaking as a way to generate prestige on the world stage and therefore international norms 
are particularly important to them. Nordic states, for example, have adopted the identity of 
peacemakers and therefore act as “norm entrepreneurs” promoting conflict resolution as an 
integral part of their foreign policies (Ingebritsen 2002). Others see mediation as a source of 
“soft power,” which helps to build their legitimacy in international affairs (Nye 2004).3 Given 
the normative interests of mediators, it is not surprising that many peace agreements since the 
end of the Cold War have contained extensive provisions for human rights (Bell 2000, 2006; 
Babbitt and Lutz 2009). In addition to the issues under discussion, the stakeholders who 
participate in peace negotiations are another important consideration. Participating in peace 
negotiations undoubtedly confers legitimacy on stakeholders and therefore international 
mediators may be reluctant to grant recognition to actors whose reputation is excessively 
tarnished. Although mediation generally involves engaging people with blood on their hands, 
certain actors are so stigmatized that it is politically difficult for international mediators to 
include them. 
 
However, international norms are not the sole concern of mediators as they are also genuinely 
interested in facilitating a sustainable peace settlement to end civil wars. Obviously, the positive 
effects of mediation only accrue when mediators successfully broker a peace settlement which 
then catches the attention of the world press. Also, given that mediation is a crowded field today, 
                                                 
3 A recurrent term in this article, the notion of ‘legitimacy,’ according to Franck (1990: 3, 19), provides an answer to 
the question: “Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?”, namely because of “the perception of those 
addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.” Herd (1999) distinguishes legitimacy as a 
mechanism of social control from coercion and self-interest. 
-12- 
 
mediators can be replaced if the conflict parties or international sponsors doubt the quality of 
their work. Therefore, the second rationale for influencing a mediation process is to maximize 
the chances that it actually produces a sustainable peace agreement. As far as the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion are concerned, this implies a practical imperative, rooted in Realpolitik: 
Only stakeholders who add value to the process and augment the chances of reaching a 
sustainable settlement should be given seats at the table, regardless of normative factors. 
 
Evidently, there are some palpable tensions between the two above-mentioned dimensions of 
contemporary peacemaking: international norms and practical requirements. Indeed, it appears 
that the conundrum of international mediation stems from the convergence of a utilitarian and a 
normative logic. The dynamics that result from this interaction play out in terms of the issues 
under discussion as well as the actors participating in peace negotiations. 
 
II. Factors of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations 
Given the two dimensions of peacemaking, normative and practical, it is useful to further 
differentiate two sets of factors within each dimension in order to build our framework. As such, 
one set of factors regarding the normative dimension favors inclusive peace negotiations, while 
the other supports exclusion – and vice versa for practical requirements. Clearly, there are no 
hard-and-fast rules for the inclusion and exclusion of stakeholders in peace negotiations. Rather, 
there are arguments which are at the core of the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Table 1, 
presented below, provides a summary, while the following paragraphs elaborate on different 
factors of inclusion and exclusion in peacemaking. These factors draw on academic analyses 
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from peace and conflict studies that have, to some extent, been incorporated into the policy and 
practice of international mediation. 
 
Table 1: Factors of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations 
 Factors of inclusion Factors of exclusion 
International 
norms 
- Democratic peace: include 
broad segments of society so as 
to foster democratic culture. 
- Peaceful civil society: include 
civil society actors so as to build 
popular support for peace. 
- Global justice: exclude alleged 
perpetrators of mass atrocities 
to ensure their accountability. 
- War on terror: exclude 
terrorist groups as a means of 
de-legitimization. 
Practical 
requirements 
- Realpolitik: include the most 
powerful military actors who 
could undermine peace. 
- Implementation perspective: 
include non-military actors 
whose support is crucial to 
consolidate peace in the long 
run. 
- Keep it simple: exclude actors 
that unnecessarily complicate 
peace negotiations. 
- Spoilers: exclude intransigent 
hardliners who seek to 
undermine a peace process. 
 
The normative dimension of inclusion and exclusion 
As far as the normative dimension of peace negotiations is concerned, there are two arguments in 
favor of inclusive processes that involve broad participation from military and civilian actors. 
The first argument pertains to the well-known democratic peace thesis: A liberal democratic 
system of governance fosters internal legitimacy as well as a peaceful international order. A 
democratic state is thus at peace with itself as well as its neighbors (Doyle 1983). This finding 
leads to a normative prescription: the international community should help transform countries 
emerging from wars according to a “liberal peace framework” including free and fair elections, 
the rule of law, respect for human rights, the separation of power, and a market economy 
(Richmond 2005; Paris 2004; Barnett 2006). Liberal peacebuilding further requires the 
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cultivation of a culture of democracy. Public education is a means to this end, as is public 
participation in political forums. This applies, for example, to efforts to draw up a new 
constitution – a process that may be part of official negotiations or take place after a peace 
agreement is signed (Hart 2001). In this context, Samuels (2006: 7, 8) argues that public 
participation fosters “a process of democratic education,” whereas exclusive processes “should 
be avoided as they undermine the quality of the democracy created in the long-term.” With 
regards to peace negotiations, these arguments suggest a normative preference for peace 
negotiations that include broad segments of society, including political parties, Diaspora groups, 
eminent individuals and civil society. ‘Elite pacts’ between the most powerful military players 
are therefore not acceptable. 
 
Related to the democratic peace is the idea of the peaceful civil society. Accordingly, civil 
society embodies a true democratic potential, which needs to be tapped in order to achieve 
“sustainable reconciliation in divided societies” (Lederach 1997; Paris 2004: 160-161). Applying 
this argument in the context of official peace negotiations, Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008: 11) 
remarked that “rarely do local civil society groups get a seat at the negotiation table.” While such 
exclusion helps mediators streamline the process, it has negative feedback effects in the long run 
(Idem: 13). In this regard, Wanis-St. John (2006) argued that the “back-channel” nature of the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace talks in 1993 as well as the exclusion of civil society from the 
negotiations, prevented the formation of a broad-based pro-peace constituency. This contributed 
to failures in the implementation of the Oslo Accords and ultimately undermined the process as a 
whole (Idem). Another argument for civil society inclusion contends that conflict parties are 
insufficiently accountable in peace processes without public participation (Barnes 2002). This 
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induces them to opt for an opportunistic, quick-fix peace deal, which does not tackle the root 
causes of conflict and fails to establish the foundation for sustainable peace (Idem). In short, the 
idea is that public participation in peace negotiations enhances the legitimacy of both the process 
and the outcome, effectively increasing the likelihood of durable peace. Relevant for our 
purposes is the normative argument that civil society actors should be included in peace 
negotiations. 
 
International norms also provide arguments for the exclusion of certain actors from official peace 
negotiations. One argument pertains to international efforts to establish a functioning system of 
global justice. This refers to the idea that people who committed acts qualifying as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide must be held accountable regardless of when and where 
these crimes took place (Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Neier 2001). Global justice advocates hope that 
such accountability leads to a deterrence effect by “shifting the borders of legitimacy and thereby 
changing the cost-benefit calculus of using atrocities as an instrument of power” (Akhavan 2005: 
419). International criminal justice does not specifically interfere with peace negotiations – 
except when perpetrators are offered amnesties for the above-mentioned crimes (Bell 2006). 
Legality aside, global justice norms make it nonetheless difficult to engage groups that are 
alleged to have committed mass atrocities, especially when charges were brought against these 
groups in an international court. Such indictments often mean that alleged war criminals are 
isolated internationally, and mediators will find it difficult to mobilize support for peace 
negotiations with these same actors. Advocates of international criminal justice do acknowledge 
that their project may complicate peacemaking efforts. In this regard, Richard Goldstone 
tellingly stated: “If you have a system of international justice, you’ve got to follow through on it. 
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If in some cases that’s going to make peace negotiations difficult, that may be the price that has 
to be paid” (quoted in McGreal 2007: 14). The normative argument associated with global 
justice, therefore, is that peace negotiations should not result in the legitimization of alleged war 
criminals. 
 
Another factor of exclusion relates to the war on terror, which has dominated the foreign policy 
of the US and other states since September 11. Most observers emphasize the geopolitical 
rationale of the war on terror and so it may seem curious to consider its normative aspects. 
However, the war on terror includes a strong symbolic dimension insofar as it attempts to 
marginalize certain actors by labeling them ‘terrorists’ – a label with a strong stigma attached to 
it (Bathia 2005). The war on terror, therefore, is a struggle to de-legitimize terrorist groups, just 
as much as to militarily incapacitate them. One aspect of this struggle is to categorically exclude 
such groups from international negotiations, based on the belief that negotiations would generate 
goodwill for alleged terrorists. In the aftermath of September 11, the slogan ‘We don’t negotiate 
with terrorists!’ has gained credence among many governments (Toros 2008). As a result, it has 
become politically difficult for international mediators to engage groups associated with 
terrorism (Zartman 2003a). Such engagement may even be illegal under US law, as a recent 
decision by the US Supreme Court suggests. In the Holden v. Humanitarian Law Project case, 
the Court provided a far-reaching interpretation of the US “material support law,” basically 
declaring illegal any interaction of third parties with designated FTOs, including training, 
advocacy, and expert advice (Supreme Court of the United States 2010).4 What is more, the 
material support law makes a controversial claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which raises the 
                                                 
4 The authority to designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations rests with the US Secretary of State, although it is 
subject to judicial review. For the current list of FTOs, see <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> 
[Accessed on 18 July 2010]. 
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possibility that acts committed by non-US citizens and those occurring outside US territory are 
punishable under this law (Colangelo 2007). The legal implications of the Supreme Court 
decision for international mediators remain unknown, but it is already clear that their ability to 
include groups that are considered to be terrorists will be restricted.5 In sum therefore, the war on 
terror as a normative argument calls for the exclusion from peace negotiations of groups alleged 
to have committed acts of terrorism. 
 
The practical dimension of inclusion and exclusion  
Turning to the practical requirements of peace negotiations, two related arguments can be 
mentioned with regards to inclusion. The first one is related to the basic realist argument that it is 
necessary to deal with the reality of power, i.e. Realpolitik, rather than with lofty norms and 
values (Carr 2001 [1939]). In the area of peace negotiations, the realist perspective finds 
expression in Zartman’s (1989 [1985]) concept of the “ripeness of conflict” (Kleiboer 1994). 
Accordingly, armed conflicts can only be resolved when parties face a “mutually hurting 
stalemate,” that is “a situation in which neither side can win, yet continuing the conflict would be 
very harmful to each,” and when they see a negotiated settlement as a “way out” (Zartman 
2003b). At this point, mediators can step in and broker a compromise that reflects the balance of 
power between the strongest military actors in a given conflict setting. A Realpolitik perspective 
thus emphasizes the practical need to include in peace negotiations the most powerful players in 
a conflict, usually military actors. 
                                                 
5 Not surprisingly, the conflict resolution community in the US is opposed to the ruling of the Supreme Court. 
Former US President Jimmy Carter, for example, stated: “We are disappointed that the Supreme Court has upheld a 
law that inhibits the work of human rights and conflict resolution groups. The “material support law” – which is 
aimed at putting an end to terrorism – actually threatens our work and the work of many other peacemaking 
organizations that must interact directly with groups that have engaged in violence. The vague language of the law 
leaves us wondering if we will be prosecuted for our work to promote peace and freedom.” Available from 
<http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rules-material-support-law-can-stand> [Accessed on 21 July 
2010]. 
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A similar argument relates to the implementation perspective of peace processes. According to 
Stedman (2002: 2), “there was … a tendency to conceive of conflict resolution in a linear 
fashion, where successful negotiation signaled an irreversible reduction in conflict.” However, 
“far from being a time of conflict reduction, the period immediately after the signing of a peace 
agreement seemed fraught with risk, uncertainty, and vulnerability” (Idem). Therefore, 
policymakers and practitioners have to look beyond peace agreements and focus on the 
subsequent phase of implementation. For mediators, this perspective requires a stronger 
awareness that what happens during peace negotiations has implications on peace consolidation 
in the long run. Unfortunately, analysts of implementation have not specifically tackled the 
question of inclusion and exclusion, although Stedman (Idem: 9) found that peace consolidation 
is more likely with “an agreement that is the culmination of years of problem-solving, 
relationship-building, and inclusion.” From this, we can deduce the following practical 
argument: actors that potentially play an important role in supporting a peace process in the post-
agreement phase should be included in peace negotiations. Powerful political actors are 
important in this regard, in addition to military stakeholders. 
 
The argument that only the most powerful actors should be included in peace negotiations has a 
logical corollary: Other actors should be excluded in order not to overextend peace talks that 
tend to be fragile constructs to begin with. In other words, mediators should keep it simple, both 
in terms of the issues under discussion and the actors they invite to participate. This argument 
finds ample support in negotiation theory. Axelrod (1984) demonstrated the conditions under 
which two self-interested actors in a competitive setting are able to establish cooperation with 
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each other. Thus, increasing the number of negotiators “will not sustain cooperation very well 
because the players have no way of focusing their punishment on someone in the group who has 
failed to cooperate” (Axelrod 1997: 7). Along similar lines, Raiffa (2004) observed that the 
inclusion of additional parties augments the complexity of the negotiation process and thus 
reduces the probability of arriving at an agreement. Cunningham (2006: 875) provides further 
support: Based on extensive empirical data, he finds that “more parties involved in conflict make 
civil wars more difficult to resolve through negotiation and therefore of longer duration.” He 
provides several explanations: multiple actors reduce the range of acceptable agreements; they 
exacerbate information asymmetries; they frequently shift alliances; and they often opt for non-
cooperation in the hope of obtaining a better agreement later (Idem). The practical lesson from 
this analysis is straightforward: mediators should focus on the main armed combatants and 
exclude other actors so as not to unnecessarily complicate peace negotiations. 
 
A final argument emerges from discussions regarding spoilers in peace processes, defined by 
Stedman (1997: 5) as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations 
threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to 
achieve it.” Effective peacemaking demands that mediators and international sponsors of peace 
processes settle on the most appropriate strategy for dealing with spoilers. In some instances, 
international custodians can accommodate spoilers, inducing them to participate in peace 
negotiations. In the case of “total spoilers” – actors that can under no circumstances be integrated 
in a peace process – the most beneficial strategy is one of marginalization. Excluding spoilers 
from peace negotiations is one element of this strategy (Idem: 14-16). Stedman’s analysis has 
been criticized, for example by Zahar (2003: 114), who argued that “building sustainable peace 
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requires bringing the parties threatening to peace into the negotiation process … and preventing 
them from developing incentives to renege during the implementation stage” (see also Greenhill 
and Major 2006/07). However, Stedman’s argument remains influential in policy-making circles: 
if a stakeholder behaves in an absolutely intransigent fashion, it is practically beneficial to 
exclude this actor from peace negotiations. 
 
III. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations 
The combination of the above-mentioned factors yields a generic conceptual framework, which 
should allow us to better understand the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Basically, 
peacemakers’ normative and practical preference for either inclusion or exclusion determines 
their approach towards each stakeholder. The framework thus generates four scenarios: two, in 
which norms and practical effectiveness are in phase and two others, where they contradict each 
other. Table 2 provides a summary of these scenarios, while the following section provides 
several short empirical examples as illustration.  
 
Table 2: Scenarios of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations 
       Practical 
 
Normative 
INCLUDE EXCLUDE 
INCLUDE Scenario 1: Include-include 
International norms provide 
arguments for the inclusion of a 
crucial stakeholder. 
Scenario 2: Include-exclude 
International norms suggest 
including a stakeholder, but this 
complicates peace negotiations. 
EXCLUDE Scenario 3: Exclude-include 
International norms suggest 
exclusion, although the participation 
of a stakeholder is crucial to 
achieving peace. 
Scenario 4: Exclude-exclude 
International norms provide 
arguments for the exclusion of a 
spoiler. 
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Four scenarios of inclusion and exclusion 
In some peace processes, distributing seats at the table is a straightforward exercise. This is the 
case when the parties to a conflict are few in number, hierarchically organized, and relatively 
respected internationally; additionally, they have a coherent political agenda and significant 
popular support. However, in many contemporary conflicts, the belligerents are fragmented, 
removed from civil society, and disparaged internationally. Under these conditions mediators 
have to address a number of questions regarding inclusion and exclusion: Given a field of many 
armed groups, which should be invited to participate in peace talks? Do representatives of civil 
society and political parties get a seat at the table? How should mediators deal with terrorist 
groups or groups whose leaders are indicted by an international court? As they evaluate these 
issues, international mediators are confronted with two fundamental questions: Does the 
participation of a given actor augment the chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement? 
And: is the participation of a given actor consistent with international norms and values? Four 
scenarios of inclusion and exclusion can be distinguished on this basis. 
 
The clearest case is given by Scenario 1(include-include), where both of the above-mentioned 
questions are answered affirmatively. This means that there is a practical rationale for inclusion, 
insofar as the participation of a given actor increases the chances of achieving a sustainable 
peace settlement, and this rationale is supported by the actor’s international reputation. The 
peace process in Nepal is a case in point. Initially, the peace talks involved the two main actors 
on the battlefield: the Maoist rebels and the King who controlled the powerful Nepalese army. 
However, the talks quickly ran into a deadlock. This changed as a result of the popular uprising 
of April 2006, after which representatives of the main political parties in Nepal, united in the 
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Seven Party Alliance (SAP), were brought into the negotiations (International Crisis Group 
2006). The participation the SAP – whose inclusion was supported by international norms related 
to democratic peace as well as peaceful civil society – helped to create a new dynamic, 
culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord of November 2006, which 
effectively ended Nepal’s civil war (Baechler 2006). Nepal thus exemplifies the useful role of 
include-include dynamics in terms of giving support to the participation of non-military actors 
when the negotiations between military belligerents are deadlocked or unlikely to produce a 
sustainable peace settlement.  
 
Similarly unambiguous is Scenario 4 (exclude-exclude), where both questions are answered 
negatively. This scenario refers to situations where the inclusion of an actor is problematic in 
terms of international norms – either because the actor is perceived to be a terrorist or accused of 
war crimes by an international court. At the same time, inclusion would be counter-productive in 
terms of effective peacemaking, given the actor’s spoiling motivation or military marginality. An 
example of this dynamic is the role of the Bosnian Serb militia during the war in the Balkans in 
the 1990s. At first, the international community opted for a pragmatic peacemaking strategy that 
included negotiations with all conflict parties, including the leaders of the Bosnian Serb militia, 
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (Hazan 2004). However, the U.S. government’s lead 
mediator, Richard Holbrooke, did not invite the two men for the final peace talks in Dayton, 
focusing instead on negotiations between the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian governments.6 This 
decision was sensible from a practical perspective, for the Bosnian Serbs were neither interested 
                                                 
6 In his book To End a War, Holbrooke (1998: 107) recounts a conversation he had with the Serbian President 
Milosevic in the run-up to the Dayton talks. When Milosevic said “You need Karadzic and Mladic to make peace”, 
Holbrooke replied: “That is your problem. Karadzic and Mladic cannot go to an international conference. They will 
be arrested if they set foot in any European country. In fact, if they come to the United States, I would gladly meet 
them at the airport and assist in their arrest.” 
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in a peace settlement, nor was their inclusion really necessary, given Belgrade’s leverage over 
them. Furthermore, the stigmatization of the Bosnian Serb leaders as a result of the indictment of 
Karadzic and Mladic by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) proved a 
useful justification for their exclusion. The Dayton talks thus illustrate that international norms 
can provide arguments for peacemakers to justify the practically sensitive exclusion of a 
stakeholder from peace negotiations. 
 
More difficult is Scenario 2 (include-exclude), where the inclusion of an actor is the right thing 
to do as far as values are concerned, but this potentially has negative consequences on the 
effectiveness of peace negotiations. Here, norms and practicality contradict each other, and this 
poses a difficult dilemma for mediators. If civil society and moderate political parties are 
excluded, peace negotiations might be perceived as cynical elite pact-making and consequently 
lack international support. If all of these actors are included, however, the negotiations become 
nearly impossible to manage for mediators. Also, as Cunningham (2006) reminds us, inclusive 
peace negotiations exacerbate information asymmetries, tactical intransigence, and shifting 
alliances, thereby decreasing the likelihood of reaching a workable agreement. Some authors 
have cited the 1993 Arusha talks to end the Rwandan civil war as an example of the flaws of 
inclusive peacemaking. According to Clapham (1998:205), the Arusha accords “gave an 
extraordinary weighting in the proposed transitional government to parties with no military 
strength, no control of territory, and an as yet undetermined level of popular support.” By 
focusing the peace negotiations on moderate, but ultimately powerless actors, and by excluding 
the more difficult but powerful players such as the Hutu extremists, international peacemakers 
facilitated a peace agreement that could never be implemented. Even worse: as Clapham argues, 
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the Arusha Accord made Hutu extremists anticipate a loss of power, causing a violent backlash 
that eventually culminated in the Rwandan genocide in April 1994 (Ibid). 
 
The most typical contradiction between the effectiveness and normative compliance of peace 
talks is posed by Scenario 3 (exclude-include). Here, effective peacemaking requires the 
inclusion of an actor as a consequence of its popular support or military might. However, such 
inclusion is problematic in terms of international norms because of the stigma attached to groups 
using terrorism or being indicted for war crimes. Indeed, the emergence of the war on terror 
since September 11, along with the institutionalization of international criminal justice through 
the establishment of the ICC, have made the ‘exclude-include’ scenario a frequent challenge for 
international peacemakers. The Palestinian organization Hamas is the best-known example in 
this respect. Hamas controls significant territory through its coercive apparatus and the group has 
major popular support, as demonstrated by the 2006 elections in Palestine. Against this 
background, a peace deal in the Middle East seems inconceivable without including Hamas. 
However, the U.S. government and the EU consider Hamas a terrorist group and refuse to deal 
with it in the context of peace negotiations (Gunning 2004). The merits of this determination 
aside, the exclusion of Hamas significantly complicates the peace process in the Middle East.7 A 
similar dilemma was posed by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), whose senior 
commanders were indicted in 2005 by the ICC on war crimes and crimes against humanity 
charges. The Government of Southern Sudan, on whose territory the LRA operated, 
subsequently instigated peace talks. At the outset, the Southern Sudanese found it difficult to find 
                                                 
7 This is precisely why a group of eminent international peacemakers, including Paddy Ashdown, Shlomo Ben-Ami, 
Alvaro de Soto, Gareth Evans, John Hume, Chris Patton, and Thorvald Stoltenberg signed an open letter in February 
2009. According to the signatories, “it is of vital importance to abandon the failed policy of isolation and involve 
Hamas in the political process.” Available from <http://www.spiegel.de/media/0,4906,20042,00.pdf>  [Accessed on 
18 July 2010]. 
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international support for the talks because many states considered peacemaking as an obstruction 
of justice that would reflect negatively on them (Lanz 2007). The negotiations eventually did 
take place, although the LRA finally withdrew from them. 
 
Two caveats 
Before concluding, two caveats have to be mentioned with regards to our framework for 
inclusion and exclusion. First, the framework does not claim that international mediators alone 
decide about matters of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, peace negotiations are sometimes 
instigated domestically and international actors only have a marginal role. Therefore, it is 
absolutely possible for an actor to be included even though in the international realm, arguments 
for its exclusion prevail. However, mediators often have significant leverage over conflict parties 
and as a consequence, they have a say as to who is included in peace talks. Also, international 
acquiescence to the distribution of seats at the table is probably necessary to generate 
international legitimacy for conflict parties – indeed, this represents a key function of peace 
negotiations. 
 
The second caveat is that the scenarios should not be interpreted as being static. Rather, they are 
highly dynamic, as the attitude of international peacemakers with regards to an actor can change 
over time. The Bosnian Serbs, for example, initially took part in peacemaking efforts, but as 
reports of their horrific crimes became public, they were increasingly marginalized. Another 
example of changing inclusion-exclusion dynamics is the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), which was initially excluded on the grounds of its terrorist activities, before becoming an 
acceptable interlocutor in the eyes of most states. Another dimension of the dynamics of 
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inclusion and exclusion is the fact that positions regarding stakeholders can differ from one 
government to another. Governments of some Arab states, for example, evaluate the role of 
Hamas in the Middle East peace process differently than their US counterpart. Therefore, the 
scenarios presented above represent the dominant (rather than an absolute) international opinion 
at a given point in time. 
 
Conclusion: Defending “Peacemaking Space” 
This article has argued that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations – the 
question of who gets a seat at the table – are affected by two independent dimensions. One 
pertains to the practical requirements of peacemaking, basically the desire of mediators to 
include all actors who are critical for reaching and subsequently implementing a peace 
agreement. The other dimension is normative in the sense that peacemakers want their 
engagement in peace processes to be in sync with the values and norms they promote on the 
global stage. As these two dimensions interact, different scenarios for inclusion and exclusion 
emerge. These scenarios carry a number of implications for international mediators and 
supporters of peace negotiations. When norms and practical requirements of peace negotiations 
are aligned – both pointing to either the inclusion or exclusion of a given stakeholder – mediators 
can bring to bear normative arguments to justify the practically sensible inclusion and exclusion 
of a stakeholder. International norms thus support the practice of peacemaking. However, this is 
not always the case. Increasingly, peacemakers are confronted with situations where norms work 
against and even undermine effective peace negotiations. This poses serious dilemmas to 
peacemaking practitioners. 
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There are, however, a number of remedies to circumvent these dilemmas. For exclude-include 
scenarios, when mediators cannot but should involve a given actor, back-channel talks can be a 
helpful instrument. Thus, peace talks with tarnished actors are kept secret from the public, 
thereby shielding mediators from negative reactions in world opinion, until they reach a 
breakthrough. This method was effectively used in the context of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords 
between the PLO and the Israeli government (Elon 1993). However, as mentioned above, some 
observers have pointed to the deficiencies of this approach (Wanis-St. John 2006). As far as 
include-exclude scenarios are concerned, where mediators should involve a broad range of 
actors, but such inclusion complicates peace talks, mediators may opt for an option that increases 
popular buy-in without the negative effect of complicating the peace talks. Accordingly, instead 
of giving actors a direct seat at the negotiation table, mediators can launch public information 
campaigns as well as engage in regular consultations with  important civil society stakeholders in 
order to provide them with a feedback loop into the negotiations (McHugh: 39-41).  
 
From a research perspective, the framework presented in this article is but an initial step towards 
a better understanding of inclusion and exclusion dynamics in peace negotiations. The next step 
would be to look at the empirical evidence, examining the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion 
in a number of peace negotiations in the post-Cold War period. Given the large number of 
variables affecting the outcome of peace negotiations, the development of a few detailed case 
studies seems to be the most appropriate methodology for this purpose. Such empirical research 
could help to refine the inclusion-exclusion framework proposed in this article. Additionally, it 
could help to develop hypotheses about the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion; for example, 
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why the scenarios for a given stakeholder change over time; or likewise, why in a given context 
normative arguments prevail over practical considerations, and vice versa. 
 
One question that cannot be avoided, although it can hardly be resolved, is the morality of 
inclusion and exclusion in peace processes. Should ethical or practical considerations prevail 
when it comes to distributing seats in peace negotiations? The position of the author is that peace 
negotiations do not operate in a moral vacuum. Norms and values play a legitimate role in peace 
negotiations, and practical effectiveness is not the only benchmark by which mediators are 
evaluated. The Munich Agreement of 1938 stands as a reminder that sometimes ethical concerns 
should prevail over whatever practical benefits negotiations may yield in the short run. However, 
the threshold for such action must be extremely high. Normally, peacemaking is a pragmatic 
business, not least because all sides of a conflict have usually committed terrible crimes and they 
often accuse each other of being terrorists and war criminals. Peacemakers should be given the 
leeway to disregard such labels and to work with any group if it helps to build sustainable peace. 
Just like humanitarian workers are struggling to preserve “humanitarian space,” mediators have 
to defend “peacemaking space” from an exaggerated projection of normative concepts and 
political agendas. If they do not succeed, their noble mission will be put in jeopardy. 
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